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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents reasons against semantic relativism. Semantic relativism is 
motivated by intuitions that are presumed to raise problems for traditional or 
contextualist semantics in contested domains of discourse. Intuition-based arguments 
are those based on competent speakers’ putative intuitions about seeming faultless 
disagreement, eavesdropper, and retraction cases. I will organize the discussion in 
three parts. First, I shall provide a brief introduction to the intuition-based arguments 
offered in favor of semantic relativism. Second, I shall indicate that there are ways for 
contextualism to explain the (appearance of) intuitions that support semantic 
relativism. Third, I shall review some experimental results and independent arguments 
that put into question the appeal of semantic relativism.  
 
1 Intuition-based Arguments 
 
Intuitions about retraction and disagreement play a crucial role in arguments for 
semantic relativism about epistemic modals, deontic modals, conditionals, knowledge 
attributions, or value and personal taste claims: the use of these expressions seems to 
be dependent on people’s perspectives, either on a relevant body of information 
available, or a relevant standard of taste. But while absolutists seem unable to capture 
the perspective-dependence of claims in that range, indexical-contextualists seem 
unable to account for the presumed intuitions of competent speakers involving 
disagreement and retraction cases. Disagreements between people with different 
perspectives in these areas seem to occur, as do retractions of past claims made by 
subjects after a change of perspective (where the perspective-independent facts 
remain the same). Likewise, we are owed a suitable explanation of what is going on 
with eavesdropper cases. 
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The papers by Dan Zeman, Filippo Ferrari, and Andy Egan and Dirk Kindermann in this 
volume provide good introductions to different aspects of the contemporary debate 
on relativism, and I will refer to them since they offer a good background to the 
discussion in this paper.  
 
Here is an example from Egan and Kindermann (in this volume) which illustrates the 
prima facie problem eavesdropper cases create to contextualist semantics. 
 
TASTE: F and G, who are from Australia, are having breakfast. G says to F, “mm, 
vegemite toast is delicious”. F replies, “that’s true! Such a joy of a morning”. At the 
next table, H and J, who are from the United States, overhear. J has never tried 
vegemite, but knows that H has. J turns to H, hand poised to lift a piece of vegemite 
toast to her mouth, and asks, “is that true?” H replies, “no, it’s not. Vegemite toast 
tastes like feet.” 
 
Cases like this are supposedly problematic for contextualists. If what G says is 
“vegemite toast is delicious, from my perspective,” H’s denial is, at best, misguided. 
But H seems to be perfectly within his rights to reply as he does. Absolutists do not 
have problems with eavesdropper cases, since whatever the sentence “vegemite is 
tasty” says, it is absolutely true (or, in our view, false!). Other kinds of examples are 
discussed in eavesdropper cases, for instance epistemic modals. Typically, these 
examples involve people with disparate opinions of what might or should be the case 
given the information available to them when they make their judgments. 
 
Intuitions about seeming faultless-disagreement cases also pose a problem for both 
absolutists and contextualists. Faultless disagreement can be characterized as follows: 
 
A faultless disagreement is a situation where there is a thinker A, a 
thinker B, and a proposition (content of judgment) p, such that: 
(a) A believes (judges) that p and B believes (judges) that not-p 
(b) Neither A nor B has made a mistake (is at fault). (Kölbel 2004, 53-
54) 
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Consider, as an illustration, this case offered by Egan and Kindermann (also this 
volume): 
 
TASTE*: F and G, who are from Australia, are having breakfast. G says to F, 
“mm, vegemite toast is delicious”. At the next table, H and J, who are from the 
United States, are sitting down to their own breakfast. J turns over to F and G's 
table, spitting out a bite of Vegemite, and says to them, “Vegemite toast is not 
delicious! This stuff tastes like feet.”  
A flat-footed reaction to have about this case: When G says “Vegemite toast is 
delicious” and J says “Vegemite toast is not delicious”, they are disagreeing. 
(And they are disagreeing about whether Vegemite toast is delicious.) But 
nobody need be making a mistake: Both are (or on suitable fillings-in of the 
case, both could easily be) getting it right, “from their own perspective.” (Egan 
and Kindermann, this volume) 
 
Absolutists are supposed to have trouble explaining that nobody need be making a 
mistake, although they have no problem explaining the existence of disagreement. The 
absolutist’s prediction is that “vegemite toast is delicious” is either true or false 
(absolutely). Hence, one of G or F in this scenario must be making a mistake. 
Contextualists are supposed to have trouble explaining this scenario, because although 
they can explain why none of the speakers is making a mistake, they apparently can’t 
explain what the interlocutors disagree about, since G is saying something like 
“Vegemite toast is delicious, from my perspective” and J is saying “Vegemite toast is 
not delicious, from my perspective,” which can both be true and accepted as such.  
 
Finally, intuitions about the retraction of claims in disputed domains are meant to 
further undermine the plausibility of contextualist or absolutist semantics for the 
contested terms in those domains. Consider this case from MacFarlane (2011): 
 
Sally and George are talking about whether Joe is in Boston. Sally carefully 
considers all the information she has available and concludes that there is no 
 4 
way to know for sure. Sally says: “Joe might be in Boston.” Just then, George 
gets an email from Joe. The email says that Joe is in Berkeley. So George says: 
“No, he isn’t in Boston. He is in Berkeley.”  
 
In this scenario, MacFarlane claims, it would be natural for Sally to retract her 
assertion that Joe might be in Boston, saying something like “I guess I was wrong; I 
take that back”, and it would not be normal for her to say, “Fine, he can’t be in Boston, 
but I still stand by what I said.” The scenario assumes that intuitions about what it is 
more natural is something the contextualist would have trouble explaining since the 
speaker would be taking back a correct assertion of a true proposition. 
 
Relativist semantic approaches are meant to be better equipped to handle these cases. 
But there are different versions of semantic relativism, making different kinds of 
commitments and theoretical requirements. Ferrari (this volume) mentions a 
distinction between two ways of understanding semantic relativism related to the one 
made by Gareth Evans (1985): the “non-indexical contextualism” defended by Kölbel 
(2003, 2004), ‘NIC’ henceforth, and the “assessment relativism” advocated by 
MacFarlane and others, ‘AR’.  
 
NIC is primarily a view about propositions. Traditionally, propositions are possible-
world-neutral: the same proposition expressed in an actual utterance might be 
expressed when thought of as made under counterfactual circumstances, “in” a 
different world. Propositional truth is hence relative to a world, in that we need a 
world to evaluate the truth of a proposition. Philosophers like David Lewis (1979), have 
argued that we also need time-neutral and subject-neutral propositions for different 
reasons to account for de se phenomena. The truth of such propositions must thus be 
further relativized to times or subjects. Truth-relativists of this stripe try to address the 
philosophical issues they confront in the previous cases described by arguing for 
additional relativization of propositional truth, to judges or taste standards. However, 
truth as a norm for assertoric acts remains absolute on NIC, because the needed 
parameters are provided once and for all by the context that the act concerns.  
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To illustrate consider that in the intuitive retraction case above, the apparent natural 
response “I take that back” would suggest that an alternative to the standard 
contextualist view should be correct. For example, one alternative to the canonical 
Kratzerian contextualist analysis of modals1 is that the quantification over a domain of 
possible worlds compatible with the information available at the context of use is not 
part of the content. Such an alternative view could take the shape of Egan (2007)’s 
proposal that bare epistemic modals express centered world propositions whose truth 
varies with respect to different centers in the same world: 
 
It might be the case that P is true relative to a centered world (w, t, i) iff it’s 
compatible with everything that’s within i’s epistemic reach at t in w that P. 
(Egan 2007, 8) 
 
This view yields some predictions about the falsity of bare epistemic possibility modals 
(BEPs) made in the past – if the prejacent of the modal (e.g., “Joe is in Boston”) is false 
with respect to the information available to a present hearer, then the modal is false. 
The view makes no strong requirement about the retrospective assessment of the 
correctness of that claim. It would be consistent with the view to say that it is natural 
for the speaker to assert “it might be the case that p” when p is compatible with the 
information available to her at the time of utterance, and for the speaker to take back 
                                               
1 On standard Kratzerian accounts, the relevant epistemic situation is the state of 
information that is available in the context where the speaker uses an epistemic modal 
sentence like “Joe might be in Boston”. An alternative sentence, “From what I know, 
Joe might be in Boston”, makes it explicit that the modal base (set of worlds selected 
by the context that are meant to be compatible with Joe being in Boston) are the 
worlds consistent with the information available to Sally. The sentence in the example 
is a bare epistemic modal and gives no explicit indication of how the modal base is to 
be restricted. Its modal base is nonetheless also determined in context: the context of 
use determines a set of possible worlds compatible with the relevant information 
available at the context of use. 
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the assertion when p is no longer compatible with information available to her at a 
later time. 
 
There is however a stronger normative view about the retraction of epistemic 
possibility modals. The alternative view is not that it would be natural for Sally to 
retract, but that she ought to. 
 
Intuitions about retraction may be used against non-indexical contextualism. 
Upon learning that Joe is down the hall, Sally ought to retract her assertion that 
Joe might be in Boston. Non-indexical contextualists lack the resources to 
explain this fact, since their account of the norm of assertion appeals only to 
the notion of truth relative to the context of assertion (a feature Sally’s 
assertion has). (MacFarlane, 2014, 256) 
 
This challenges any view according to which an assertion is correct only if it is true 
relative to the context of assertion. But this relies essentially on the strength of the 
intuition that a retraction is obligatory when the newly available information entails 
the falsity of the prejacent of the modal.  
 
MacFarlane seems to be relying on a point Michael Dummett (1978) made in 
connecting the truth of what we say and the point of our saying it, i.e., the point of 
assertion. Dummett’s claim was that a “well-defined consequence of an assertion’s 
proving incorrect” is that the speaker must withdraw it” (Dummett 1978, 20). Thus, by 
holding that retraction is mandatory in what he calls the assessment context, 
MacFarlane is AR plausible. If it were the case that a retraction of a previous assertion 
is required, then that assertion must be incorrect. But if the assertion was correct (as 
MacFarlane puts it, “accurate”) when it was made (the speaker said what was true 
when she spoke), and is incorrect (“inaccurate”) when its retraction is required, then 
its correctness conditions must be themselves relative. This would be the point of 
assessment-relative truth: to capture this feature of some assertions whose 
correctness would itself be assessment-relative. This is the more radical relativist view 
on which it is the appraisal of a “use” of a proposition (as MacFarlane puts it) that may 
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change: while an assertion of “vegemite is tasty” or of “Joe might be in Boston” might 
meet a truth norm when evaluated relative to the standard prevailing in the context in 
which it is made, thus being perfectly accurate, it may come to be false, and hence 
wrong, when evaluated from another context.2 Evans (1985) argues that this is 
importantly different from NIC and more difficult to motivate, and we agree with him 
(cf. Marques 2014a, 2018), as we argue below. 
 
2 Contextualist Replies 
 
There are several responses to the intuition-based arguments offered to motivate truth-
relativism.3 Since the point of this paper is to argue against semantic relativism, I shall 
be brief in considering those replies. Zeman’s contribution to this volume offers a nice 
compilation of the variety of responses that contextualists have offered with respect 
to faultless-disagreement cases. He identifies three kinds of strategies. First, there are 
authors that argue that the examples based on the appearance of faultless 
disagreement are often undetermined. The descriptions of the putative intuitive cases 
are said to fail to distinguish between “exocentric” and “autocentric” uses of the 
relevant phrases, to ignore the possibility of collective uses, or of generic uses. Once 
those distinctions are made available, the intuitions about the existence of 
disagreement should dissipate (cf. Schaffer 2011, Glanzberg 2007, Stojanovic 2007, 
Cappelen and Hawthorne 2007).  
 
                                               
2 Wright (2016: 189) also points out the significance of the distinction between NIC and 
AR. In contrast, Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009) and Cappelen and Huvenes (2018) 
adopt the sort of view I’m opposing here, contending that the most salient difference 
among different relativist views “is arguably that relativists have different views about 
what propositions are true or false relative to”; cf. Kölbel (2015). This take informs 
choices in the presentation and discussion of the issues, with confounding 
consequences. 
3 Kölbel (2009, §3) lists additional related data. 
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Second, some disagreements and impressions of disagreement are said to be 
pragmatic. For instance, some impressions of disagreement can result from a 
presupposition that interlocutors are speaking from the same perspective 
(presupposition of commonality) and may dissipate once they realize that is not the 
case; or they may result from presupposing that at least one of the interlocutors are 
right, or that one of them is speaking from a superior perspective. Alternatively, other 
disagreements should rather be recognized as metalinguistic. Finally, some 
disagreements may concern incompatible conversational moves (cf. López de Sa 2008, 
Parsons 2013, Zakkou 2015, Sundell 2011, Plunkett and Sundell 2013, Ludlow 2014, 
Silk 2016). These pragmatic disagreements, or impressions of disagreement, are 
compatible with contextualism. Third, disagreements that are pragmatic in nature are 
sometimes claimed to be motivated by conative or non-doxastic disagreements, where 
those who disagree in attitude may have conflicting attitudes4 (cf. Huvenes 2012, 
Marques 2015, 2016a, 2016b, 2019)5. 
 
Presumably some of these strategies are available concerning responses to the 
intuitive strength of eavesdropper cases. Although most explanations of the intuitions 
of disagreement focus on evaluative or taste predicates, some focus specifically on 
epistemic and deontic modal cases. For instance, Dowell (2011, 2013) persuasively 
argues that disagreement and eavesdropper cases are not real challenges to the 
standard Kratzerian contextualist semantics for modals. She suggests that when the 
proper constraints on contexts are satisfied, namely, when speaker’s domain 
restricting intentions are properly made manifest (a condition she names “Publicity”) 
the intuitions about the challenging cases – disagreement, eavesdroppers – dissipate.  
 
Finally, several people have questioned the strength of the retraction of intuitions, 
which I will discuss below.  
 
                                               
4 The notion of conflicting attitudes was already advanced by Stevenson (1944). 
5 Absolutists can also offer replies to faultless disagreement cases, as Zeman (this 
volume) explains. (Cf. Shafer 2011). 
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3 Limitations of Relativism 
 
Many authors have pointed out that relativists are not better positioned to explain 
disagreement data than contextualists are.6 NIC aims to account for relativism by 
ascribing exclusionary contents to utterance contents such that “it has to be the case 
that at least one of them is false” (Knobe and Khoo 2016, 1), or, in other words, such 
that they can’t be both right. Like others, we have argued that exclusionary contents 
are neither necessary nor sufficient for disagreement. First, they don’t suffice to 
explain disagreement: If Lewis and his followers are right, an utterance of “I am making 
a mess” and one of “I am not making a mess” by another agent have exclusionary 
contents, but we don’t have impressions of disagreement about them.  
 
Dinges (2017a, 730; 2017b, 501) buys the exclusionary-content explanation, and, in 
work purporting to establish that we should adopt relativism on the abductive grounds 
that it is more “elegant” than rival views (2017b, 497), he confronts this argument. He 
submits (2017b, 502) that there are no assertions (or there shouldn’t be?) of de se 
contents.7 However, proponents of de se contents have provided well-developed 
                                               
6 As is argued by Stojanovic (2007), Moruzzi (2008), Rosenkranz (2008), Iacona (2008), 
Francén (2010), etc. 
7 Caso (2014) also confronts the objection, like Dinges from a perspective that is 
consistent with NIC even if his sympathies lie with AR. He buys the explanatory 
exclusion explanation of disagreement too (2014, 1322). He dismisses the objection by 
claiming that the relativist view is not intended to be applied to the discourses for 
which de se or de nunc contents have been advanced (2014, 1314, 1317). This 
overlooks the point of the objection, that is, that the possibility of such discourses 
shows that the relativist alleged explanans for the impression of disagreement is no 
good, because it might be in place without any impression of disagreement being 
triggered. 
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proposals to account for their felicitous assertion even in such cases.8 And I have 
argued elsewhere (cf. Marques and García-Carpintero 2014, Marques 2014a), there 
are felicitous assertions of what on relativist accounts are contents that are neutral 
with respect to standard-of-taste parameters (contradicting Dinges’ claim). Two 
foodies with fully developed taste sensitivities, fully aware that there are serious 
differences in their respective rulings, might engage in the debates we are considering, 
“this is tasty” – “no, it isn’t”, and it might be perfectly rational for them to do so.9 
 
Exclusionary contents are not necessary for disagreement, either. In previous work, I 
mentioned Horn’s cases of “metalinguistic negation”10 (Marques 2014b, 2015), in 
connection with Barker’s (2002, 2013) observation that one can use expressions with 
an indeterminate meaning to make proposals for their contextual precisification. Given 
this, one might use the negations to reject such a proposal. Sundell (2011) persuasively 
elaborates on related ideas, and there is now a huge literature developing the point11. 
  
Khoo and Knobe (2016) confirm previous experimental evidence that ordinary 
speakers might be sensitive to the point that there might be disagreements without 
exclusionary contents12. As already mentioned in the previous section, it has also been 
                                               
8 For recent versions, see the papers by Recanati, Maier, Weber and Kindermann in 
García-Carpintero and Torre (2016). 
9 Dinges (2017a: 735) considers cases of this sort. 
10 These are cases in which one uses expressions of disagreement to object to the 
appropriateness of an assertion on grounds other than the falsity of its content: “John 
failed some students” – “No, he failed all of them”; “John has a car” – “No, he has a 
Ferrari Testarossa”. These fall under the various forms of pragmatic disagreement 
mentioned earlier (Cf. also García-Carpintero 2008). 
11 Cf. for instance Plunkett and Sundell (2013), Ludlow (2014), López de Sa (2015). 
12  Sarkissian et al. (2011) present evidence that also appears to suggest that previous 
results about presumed folk intuitions can be accounted for by the fact that relevant 
disparities in the judges were not made salient. (See Marques and García-Carpintero 
(2014: 707-8) for some reservations about the interpretation of such results.) 
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repeatedly pointed out, and developed at length in different directions, that rejections 
might tap into disagreements of a practical nature, without the need for exclusionary 
content.13 The purported explanation of the disagreement data that NIC offers doesn’t 
thus appear promising.  
 
A similar diagnosis applies to AR. Here the issue turns primarily on whether there is 
any good reason to accept that, as MacFarlane contends, the same assertion can be 
accurately made in its context, but assessed as inaccurate or incorrect from another 
context providing a conflicting appraisal. With respect to disagreements, specifically, 
MacFarlane agrees that under one understanding of disagreement, relativists are not 
better positioned than contextualists. In fact, we should ask, why would people 
disagree when they don’t share a perspective? MacFarlane’s 2007 response is one that 
any contextualist can likewise offer: 
 
Perhaps the point is to bring about agreement by leading our interlocutors into 
relevantly different contexts of assessment. If you say ‘‘skiing is fun’’ and I 
contradict you, it is not because I think that the proposition you asserted is 
false as assessed by you in your current situation, with the affective attitudes 
you now have, but because I hope to change these attitudes. Perhaps, then, the 
point of using controversy inducing assessment-sensitive vocabulary is to foster 
coordination of contexts. We have an interest in sharing standards of taste, 
senses of humor, and epistemic states with those around us. The reasons are 
different in each case. In the case of humor, we want people to appreciate our 
jokes, and we want them to tell jokes we appreciate. In the case of epistemic 
states, it is manifestly in our interest to share a picture of the world, and to 
learn from others when they know things that we do not. (MacFarlane 2007: 
30). (My emphasis)  
 
                                               
13 Marques and García-Carpintero (2014) and Marques (2015, 2016, 2019) appeal to a 
“hybrid expressivist” view. 
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Considerations about the pull towards coordination can be met without embracing 
relativist semantic revisions. To see this, consider a case that Dinges (2017b, 503) uses 
for an abductive argument for relativism in which A, whom B barely knows, offers 
advice to her regarding a restaurant by uttering “The food is tasty”. As Dinges points 
out, if C then asks B about the food at the restaurant, it would be inappropriate for B 
to produce in her turn “The food is tasty” without having yet tried it. If, however, the 
topic had been all along the restaurant opening hours or food specialty, it would have 
been perfectly ok for B to pass on A’s testimony. Dinges (2017b, 511) contends that 
the relativist has a simple explanation, which I rather doubt, but I lack the space to go 
into this here. 
 
Be this as it may, Dinges’ discussion highlights the difficulties that relativism poses to 
make sense of exchanges like that between A and B, and the very existence of a 
testimonial practice understood along the lines it promotes. We must put aside 
situations in which A and B are justified to take A’s claim to concern a common 
standard; for in such cases, disagreement offers no support for relativism: at least one 
party makes a false claim, and whatever good standing both parties have can only be 
epistemic. But, if so, A’s claim must be equivalent to “I like the food there” (2017b, 
514). Given that a commonality assumption is not in place, that doesn’t help B to make 
her own mind, and should discourage her adoption of the relativist proffered 
proposition as good enough for her own circumstances. Moreover, as can be 
appreciated from the possibility of pragmatic and conative conflicts, contextualists can 
appeal to conflicts over incompatible attitudes consistent with conversations like the 
described being attempts to change other people’s attitudes.  
 
MacFarlane later adopted a different approach. Instead of trying to explain the point 
of communicating and disagreeing over perspectival contents, he now argued for 
pluralism about disagreement and faultlessness: 
 
Instead of arguing about what is “real” disagreement, then, our 
strategy will be to identify several varieties of disagreement. We can 
then ask, about each dialogue of interest, which of these kinds of 
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disagreement can be found in it, and we can adjudicate between 
candidate theories of meaning by asking which theories predict the 
kinds of disagreement we find. (MacFarlane 2014: 119) 
 
Zeman (this volume) nicely introduces the varieties MacFarlane considers.14 I will not 
go over these here. Yet, once the discrimination between different kinds of putative 
disagreements has been done, it is no longer clear whether speakers may plausibly be 
expected to have intuitions about each of those senses of disagreement.15 Some of the 
more “minimal” forms MacFarlane declares to be types of disagreement (such as 
simple noncotenability, i.e. exclusionary contents) can of course be stipulated to be a 
form of disagreement, but it’s unclear what independent motivation can be offered in 
its support. 
 
Egan (2007) and MacFarlane (2011), among others, also argued that contextualist 
semantics cannot account for eavesdropper cases. But, with respect to deontic and 
epistemic modals, not only do contextualists have a response, as Dowell (2011, 2013) 
claims; competent speakers don’t appear to share the intuitions that would support 
revisionary relativist theories. In a joint paper, Knobe and Yalcin (2014) experimentally 
tested eavesdropping and retraction in cases involving epistemic modals. With respect 
to extra-contextual assessors their experiments revealed that eavesdroppers did not 
tend to judge that a claim like Sally’s ‘Joe might be in Boston’ would be false when new 
information about Joe’s whereabouts came to light, against the presumed intuitions 
that eavesdroppers would predominantly assess the sentence as true only if ‘Joe is in 
Boston’ were consistent with the information available to them (qua assessors). 
 
And finally, the most serious intuition-based argument against contextualism concerns 
retraction cases. It’s the presumed requirement to retract that makes AR distinctive, 
and without it AR would be unmotivated. As I have argued (Marques 2014, 2018), it’s 
                                               
14 Others argue for a unified notion of disagreement, e.g. Belleri and Palmira (2013). 
15 For additional skepticism about some of the notions involved here, see for instance 
Palmira (2015), Carter (2014), Eriksonn and Tiozzo (2016) 
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not just that the requirement to retract doesn’t seem well motivated. As experimental 
data suggests, speakers tend to disagree that what Sally said (“Joe might be in 
Boston”) is false, while tending to agree that it would be appropriate for her to retract 
(Knobe and Yalcin 2014). This seems puzzling. However, this experiment didn’t address 
the presumed requirement to retract that, as MacFarlane holds, motivates AR. In new 
experimental work, I found that indeed participants tend to disagree that the modal is 
false, and also tend to disagree that there is any requirement to retract when the truth 
of the prejacent of the ‘might’ claim is incompatible with new information available to 
them (Marques, manuscript). 
 
There is a more serious reason against relativism. In a 1985-paper, Gareth Evans raised 
a challenge to the coherence of relative truth. A modification of the challenge can be 
given against AR. The main point is that rational sincere speakers cannot be bound by 
assessment-relative standards of correctness or accuracy, and that’s why they are not 
required to retract assertions that were correctly made (true with respect to the 
intended context) with propositions as contents that turn out to be not true with 
respect to a new “assessment context”. 
 
Evans’s point has an a priori character. It doesn’t question the rationality of particular 
moves in an assertoric practice legitimized by assessment relativism, but rather the 
rationality of such a practice itself. The question is whether it’s rational to implement a 
relativistic assertoric practice. MacFarlane (2014: 311-9) discusses the issue, but his 
rationale for justifying a practice modeled by AR only takes into consideration what I 
think is a negligible dimension. He offers considerations of economy: against what 
both NIC and contextualism mandate, it makes for some sort of efficiency not to have 
to keep track of the contexts relative to which claims or proposals are made, 
appraising them only with respect to current standards. I think that this lacks 
significance when weighed against the crucial reasons to have a practice of making 
assertions, asking questions or giving directions, such as pooling our information.  
 
Cases like the following, which illustrate Evans’s point, cast doubts on the requirement 
to retract past taste assertions: 
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Imagine that Smith is aware that […] her culinary opinions depend on her 
current dispositions towards food, etc. She knows, moreover, that certain 
standards are bound to change with time […] that people in her family, when 
they reach 60, lose the capacity to appreciate sweets. [In the future] she will 
not think that crème brûlée is tasty [...] On MacFarlane’s account, she should 
be puzzled, in envisaging now that there will come to be situations in which she 
will be forced to retract her current assertion, while, from the viewpoint of her 
present context of assessment, those situations do not constitute at all a 
reason for so doing. […] Certainly, Smith could have aimed at the context she 
knows she will occupy when she is 60—but had she done so, her standard of 
taste at 60 would still have been a standard of taste fixed by the context of 
utterance. (Marques 2014a: 370) 
 
Similar seeming puzzles arise if we suppose that assertors of epistemic possibility 
modal claims are obliged to retract their present assertions when, in the future, the 
prejacents of the sentences they use turn out to be incompatible with the evidence 
they then acquire. Von Fintel and Gillies (2008) point out that not all ‘might’ claims are 
retracted in the face of new evidence (p. 81ff). In fact, in the situation Sally finds 
herself in, it would have been perfectly natural for her to reply: “Look, I didn’t say Joe 
is in Boston; I said he might be. Maybe he changed his mind and canceled the trip. 
Sheesh!” 
 
When we make sincere assertions, we aim to speak truly, like Smith who asserts 
“Crème Brûlée is tasty” fully aware that she will find herself in situations where she 
will assert the negation of that sentence, or Sally who asserts “Joe might be in Boston” 
fully aware that there are probable situations in the near future in which she will 
assert “Joe can’t be in Boston”. If truth is assessment-sensitive, there is no final answer 
to the question of whether these assertions were correct when they were made. 
Speakers committed to the truth of what they asserted, and when they find 
themselves in situations where they assert the negation of the earlier claims, they 
commit to the truth of the new assertion. But they won’t be in a position to uphold the 
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correctness of the earlier assertion and of that of the later one. How could they 
purport to commit to both?16 There’s no answer as to whether the aim of speaking 
truly is ever achieved. At best, speakers can aim to speak truly from a context. But, 
from which context? If we can give an answer to this question, then we also generate, 
as Evans put it, a “once-and-for-all assessment of utterances, according to whether or 
not they meet whatever condition the answer gave.” 
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